Challenges to Maritime Security in Southeast Asia

Challenges to naval Security in southeasteast AsiaLt Mohd Fadhil bin Ahmad randomnes seast Asia The Current Challenges of Mari era SecurityIntroductionSince ancient times, the control (or to develop at least some forms of control) all over the mer fundamenttile waterways has always been the ambition of littoral states as nearly as those with vested and specific interests. The reasons can be abundance, much(prenominal) as that for the purpose of facilitating peaceful trade and commercial, or nations or empires expansion or projection of power and influence, or for gaining quick wealth through a little peaceful path of piracy. With everyone going for a slice of cake, it then resulted in disputes, conflicts and even war and some argon hitherto unresolved until today.Back to the present, littoral states or these adjacent to sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) atomic number 18 instanter non unaccompanied faced with tall order of keeping of SLOC safe for navigation and secure d of threats, which approximately often than not ar mostly non-traditional in nature, but be overly compeld by extra regional and transnational concerned parties to do so, as such argon made preoccupied in keeping these interested parties at bay, i.e. from interfering. Littoral states argon expected to ensure safety and security system as their responsibilities, on their feature effort and with heavy financial cost, without any modality of burden sharing through international funding. But, the capitulum then, do they (the littoral states) really want any forms of funding with the terms and conditions which can be interpreted as external interference? Especially, when international exercisingrs have already considered the malacca passport for an example as an international sea lane with their rights of usage.Apart from these threats and the conflict of interest, this strategic outlook or landscape can also be looked upon as having its own opportunities at the same time. Al though the factors that shape these opportunities are mainly dictated by economic gain, the aspect of security interests could lead to separate mutual beneficial partnership.A megabucks has been said on the needs for collaboration or joint efforts with suppose to maintaining the safety and security of our adjacent waters which include from the north-west of the Indian Ocean-Andaman, down to the passports of Malacca and the Straits of Singapore, and up to the South mainland chinaware Sea as well as the adjacent seas, oceans and waters. Has this SLOC not attracted enough attention with cypher to the availability of both threats/challenges and opportunities? In this regard, have we not seen the rising rime of piracy at the Straits of Malacca before, in the early 2000s of the increased traffics and trades that play this SLOC (from 56,000 ships in year 2000 to 73000 in 2011 for ship of more(prenominal) than 300 GRT)? Has this situation not attracted influential players-major a rmy and economic powers, into this foray? These only proved how spanking this SLOC is, and why all concerned parties should coordinate, cooperate and collaboratebilateral or multi-laterally, for a concentrated/ incorporate effort.ChallengesOver the years, ASEAN through its various forums has introduced numerous commendable efforts and initiatives to ensure the safety and security of its water. The outcome has been unco encouraging especially when incidents of piracy has dropped to a near-zero. However, there are still other works to be done especially at the Straits of Malacca and more work elsewhere vis-a-vis the South mainland China Sea.With regard to the Straits of Malacca, with piracy no longer in the limelight, the main concern now is the increasing traffic volume as mentioned earlier. As we know, the Straits of Malacca is one narrow Strait and with this increased in traffic volume coordinated efforts now moldiness be focused towards regulating the northern-bound passage in ensuring navigational safety and putting in place a mechanism to terminus rapture-related pollutions-by irresponsible acts or mishap at sea.Competition over ResourcesThere are some adds with regard to the nautical Southeast Asia waters which have been wearing out such as competition over resources. As we know, ocean Southeast Asia, which are located between the Pacific and Indian Ocean, is composed of the volcanic and non-volcanic islands and also the island arcs. The geology of the stadium is highly complex but it is very promising in term of resources development. lengthy continental shelves washed by seas of less than 200metres deep join many of the islands to Australia and Asia. The Continental Shelf areas are the important location of sedimentary rock which contains of yields embrocate, tin, and others minerals.The growing in demand for energy is obviously generating greatly increased in offshore exploration for oil and instinctive gas. China for example, has expende d massive efforts in exploring for oil in South China Sea as well as the Pearl River Basin to the North of Hong Kong. Nowadays, we can see that the developed oil-fields in Southeast Asian waters are small and located only in continental shelf area. So that, reservoirs are being depleted and increased in exploration and competition are to be expected.At present, oil, offshore minerals and also fisheries are the main central point of disputes and future conflict. China has exacted a major portion of the South China Sea makes other littoral feel threatened against other interests over the South China Sea and its resources. Most of the coterminous states have produceed a 200 marine mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Indonesian and the Filipino concept of the archipelagic state were incorporated in the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea. Article 47 of this conventionalism utter that an archipelagic state may draw straight baselines to the outermost points of the outermost isl and. Furthermore, the 200 nautical mile EEZ, other claims of the littoral states, and the archipelagic claims of Indonesian and the Philippines and also the Chinas undefined popular claim, leave no uncontested or unclaimed nautical areas in Southeast Asian waters. practice session like what had happened with regard to the Spratly Island where friction and some violence have occurred which together with claimed by Malaysia, China, Vietnam, Taiwan and Philippines.Because of the pressure for a greater exploration develops, the areas with potential for exploration and drilling, which are normally located on or near continental shelves and gainsay boundaries are becoming pressure points for disputes. The areas which are currently in disputed and believed to have hydrocarbon potential are the South-western Gulf of Thailand (involving Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam), the waters North of Natuna Island (involving Indonesia, Malaysia, China and Vietnam), the waters offshore of Brunei (in volving Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and China) and also the Spratly Island (involving China, Malaysia, Philippine and Vietnam).The fisheries issue is more difficult to address in many ways since fish do not respect political boundaries. The fishery resource management problems are largely unresolved and oftentimes not even identified. The recent changes in the Law of the Sea, especially the establishment of 200 nautical mile economic zones, make governments are ill-prepared to cope. The establishment of the 200 nautical mile economic zones has created severe harm for fishermen of certain Southeast Asian nations. For example, Thailand has suffered the loss of some 115,000 square miles of traditional fishing grounds. It is reported that most of the Thailand fishing fleet has been force back into the Gulf of Thailand which is already overfish.Sea Lines of communications, the Straits, the Achipelagoes and Extended JurisdictionThe query of the unilateral extension of naval jurisdiction is gradually over loading regional mechanisms designed to negate conflict. Political orientation and economic circumstances are important fact ors in the temptation to use force in order to establish or defend a maritime claim. Within ASEAN companionship there are well-established, if not perfect, informal procedures for settlement of disputes. The communist states of the East and Southeast Asia are less practicable and have used naval power in the recent past to emphasize their claim to areas in the South China Sea. Use of the straits and sea lines of communication throughout the region restore not only regional powers but also international trading community. Closure, for any reason, of the straits of Malacca and Singapore would severely damage the economies of Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, as well as other states. Major shipping routes of international importance use Indonesias Sunda, Lombok, Makasar, and Ombai-Wetar straits. The Philippines, which also has declared its achi pelagic status, possesses international passages within its territory.The maintenance of aerofoil sea lines of communication is of great interest to nations using the South China Sea. The major north-south routes transit the Natunas area disputed by Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. They also pass through the Paracel and Spratly zones disputed by China and Vietnam as well as other states. Future local naval engagements in either of these areas entrust impede or lengthen the transit period of user nations. The extended jurisdictional claims of China (legally unspecified but comprehend much of the South China Sea) and Vietnam require the most attention. The Chinese and Vietnamese claim the Paracel and the Spratly areas based on their claims of historical occupation. The Chinese evicted the South Vietnamese from Paracels in the 1974. Oil is being extracted to the west of these islands and is rumoured to exits on or very near the Chinese-occupied Paracels. The Spratly area viewed as b eing potentially rich in oil and natural gas. So far China has not pressed its claims to the Spratlys by occupying one or more of the islands.Vietnam and Indonesia are currently at a stalemate in their discussions over the delineation of their maritime boundaries. The talk have been going on for five years and involves rights to hydrocarbons located in the continental shelf north of the Natuna islands which are occupied by Indonesia. Indonesia has allowed Marathon Oil Company to explore in this area. Vietnam has vigorously and challenged this contract and stated that foreign companies should pay attention to this matter and should not conduct survey and exploration operations in the disputed area without Vietnams consent. Any oil company which failed to observe these instructions must be held responsible for the consequences arising from its act.Impact of the Arms Build-up and Major Power Interests The South China Sea and the maritime waters of Southeast Asia are of major strategic importance to the littoral nations as well as the major powers. The guarantee of innocent passage for the merchant and military ships of all nations is fundamental to stability in Asia. Passage in these waters, however, is becoming increasingly constricted especially in the sea lines of the South China Sea and the Vital Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Wetar-Ombai, all of which are within Indonesian archipelago.Waters adjacent to these sea lines as well as the straits are sensitive for security and political reasons. These seas are touch by countries of very different political ideologies and political outlooks. The western area (Spratly Islands) of the South China Sea especially sensitive, mainly because so many states have made claims to and have occupied island in this area. probable strategic uses for the more developed island islands in the Spratly included bases for sea line interdiction, surveillance and possible open up points for further attacks. The Philippines an d the Indonesia have particular reason to seek for influence maritime activity in part of their archipelagos. The south of the Philippines, especially the Sulu Sea area, is a focal point for continuing friction with our country. Supplies for the continuing military support for the Moro National Liberation Front and New Peoples Army in Zamboanga, Tawi-Tawi, Palawan and Davao are via sea routes. Indonesia views the eastern portion of the country with continuing concern for security.Other strategic considerations include continuing use of the major straits for military purposes. East to west passage in important for step up units of all navies. North to south passage is also importance to submarines.The existence of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines and Soviet bases in Vietnam serve to complicate the security picture in the South China Sea area. Clark behavior Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines have been importance features of U.S. security policy in Asia since population War II. Both are vital logistics support facilities which allow the U.S. Navy and Air Force to stand behind security commitments made to Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. These bases also support U.S naval missions in the Indian Ocean.The join States has provided a continuous military strawman in Asia since 1975. This bearing has enabled the ASEAN nations, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, to increase their gross national point of intersection by an average of 10 per cent. While the United State does not take credit for the sparing and the security successes of most of these countries, its policy of deterring Soviet, North Korean and Vietnamese intimidation has been effective. In the mid 1980s, the Soviet has a quantitative advantage in the military balance in the Pacific region, having greater numbers of newer, more sophisticated submarines, tactical atmospheric statecraft, bombers, and infantry and so on. At present Soviet naval and disperse forces would be s everely disadvantaged in a conflict with United State forces in maritime Southeast Asia. Chinas impact on the security of maritime Southeast Asia already been adumbrate as it affects the Spratly area and also Chinas relation with Vietnam. Other considerations worthy of mention are the upgrading of China merchant fleet and evolution of the PLA naval forces in recent years. China has not entered the maritime power competition but spend a pennyly has the capacity and will to do so. In the near future, China will further expand its volume of maritime trade on a global scale. The PLA navy is attempting to catch up rapidly with those of the Soviet Union and the United States by developing a mobile nuclear deterrent. It is also obvious from the interview with Liu Huaquing, head of the PLA navy, that China is serious about protecting its claim to the resources of the South China Sea as well as asserting itself as a maritime power in Asia.At present, the Soviets are effectively projectin g their military power into an area which had antecedently been a preserve of the West. It is disconcerting to United States power to have the Soviets expanding their air and naval assets in Cam Ranh mouth as well as conducting a large scale construction programme within that base. The Cam Ranh bespeak base in being expended into an advanced staging and repair facility which will save the Soviets time in projecting their naval forces into the Indian Ocean. In parallel and as back-up facility, in case of a break in relation with Vietnam, which is not likely to happen. The soviet are also developing the naval facility in the Kampuchean port of Ream. These points having been made, the soviet presence in Southeast Asia is prominent only in the military area. The KGB activity in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia in recent years has been closely monitored by the security agencies of these countries. However, the soviets present no intent models for economic development.Future arrivemen ts and ConclusionThe 1982 UNCLOS provides compulsory procedures for the settlement of disputes. Many venues are open to disputing parties, including arbitration, adjudication and conciliation, as well as other regional or local ad hoc procedures. As an example is ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Expert Working Group (ADMM Plus EWG) on marine Security. This is one EWG which is giving full attention in as far as providing a computer programme for information sharing among ADMM Plus countries in the hope of enhancing and further developing mutual confidence towards regional peace and stability is concerned. It is sure that with the activities already conducted such as the Table-Top Exercise (TTX) held last year, and those already on the drawing board (i.e. to establish a virtual communication network/website, to conduct exercises at sea) interoperable operational cooperation in common areas of maritime security will soon get going a norm (standard practice) among members, at le ast, where maritime security is concerned.Conflict in which resources are said to be the major issue but where, in reality, strategic position is the major motivation, will be more difficult to resolve. Solutions to fisheries questions will apparently leave some countries, such as Thailand, disadvantaged. The claims to ownership of hydrocarbon are, in theory, more easily negotiated. peg development in production and policy is a possible solution to competing claims within ASEAN. With no clear sight of a permanent solution, the easiest way out as a short term taproom is to a model a Joint Development Area (JDA) involving all the respective claimants such that of the Malaysia-Thailand JDA which jointly exploit fisheries and hydrocarbon-based resources. It is worth noting that this idea of JDA has in fact caught the attention of claimants to other disputed areas as well. Therefore, if we could not resolve the challenges we might as well capitalise on the opportunities.The question of providing a security presence in the region will increasingly become a problem for the regional powers. It may become increasingly difficult for the United States to continue to maintain its long term air and naval presence in Southeast Asia. Political and economic constraints are cited by friends of United States when there are quest to share greater cooperative security burdens.The major security burden of the future will ensconce upon the ASEAN nations, Australia, Japan and South Korea. National interest in the security terms may serve to cut through other inherent obstructions such as South Korea-Japanese cultural issues and the lingering effect of anti-Japanese feeling in Southeast Asia as a result of World War II. Australia may have a heightened role to play, given a receptive political climate, as a partner in co-operative naval and air patrol agreements and as a fall-back position for the United State forces. The regional communist states (China, Vietnam) appear to be tr ansferring to the South China Sea their current confrontational relations. In order for stability to be kept up(p) in the South China Sea, China and Vietnam will need to avail themselves of existing mechanisms for resolutions of disputes.ReferencesASEAN Partners invited to Jointly Develop Gas Field, Business Times (Kuala Lumpur), 14 November 1984.The Malaysian Chief of Defence Force Presentation on 10th ASEAN Chief of Defence Force informal Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 19 to 21 Mac 2013.Robert A. Brand, Defence defeat Under An American View, Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1985.J.C Johari, International Relation and Politics, (New Delhi Sterling Publisher 1997).You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (Australia Allen Unwin, 1999).